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The large-scale introduction of HIV and AIDS services in Mozambique from 2000
onwards occurred in the context of deep political commitment to sovereign nation-
building and an important transition in the nation’s health system. Simultaneously, the
international community encountered a willing state partner that recognised the need
to take action against the HIV epidemic. This article examines two critical policy
shifts: sustained international funding and public health system integration (the move
from parallel to integrated HIV services). The Mozambican government struggles to
support its national health system against privatisation, NGO competition and internal
brain drain. This is a sovereignty issue. However, the dominant discourse on self-
determination shows a contradictory twist: it is part of the political rhetoric to keep the
sovereignty discourse alive, while the real challenge is coordination, not partnerships.
Nevertheless, we need more anthropological studies to understand the political
implications of global health funding and governance. Other studies need to examine
the consequences of public health system integration for the quality of access to
health care.
Keywords: HIV and AIDS; Mozambique; scale-up; governance; global health
Introduction
Free large-scale antiretroviral (ARV) treatment through the public health system began in
Mozambique in June 2004. The Mozambican government and supportive donors
favoured a decentralised model in which HIV and AIDS services would be integrated
into the public health system. However, services provided by NGOs began in 2001
according to the ‘exceptional’ HIV and AIDS model in which infrastructure, including
voluntary counselling and testing centres and day hospitals, was established separately
from normal health services, an effort supported by large increases in international
disease-specific funding (Pfeiffer et al., 2010). This scenario generated the still ongoing
service integration process marked by power discourses (sovereignty, ownership, national
self-determination) and partnership encounters (coordination, capacity, respect and trust).
Drawing on ethnographic research in Mozambique, I argue that Mozambican health care
remains highly politicised with roots in post-independence priorities foremost implying
sovereign self-determination. However, I will show that it is part of the political rhetoric
to keep the sovereignty discourse alive and dominant, while in practical terms the real
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challenge is coordination, not partnerships. Yet, the move from AIDS exceptionalism
towards normalised AIDS services in Mozambique’s public health system strengthened
by exceptional sustained international funding produces thought-provoking political
questions for the governance of global health: will this create global health exception-
alism? Does this implicate exceptional global health governance? What are the political
implications for ‘local government ownership’ in terms of self-determination and
sovereignty, when de facto foreign powers decide and pay?
Notably, during the first decade of the epidemic, HIV exceptionalism referred to a
departure from classic public health measures (compulsory testing, name reporting,
compulsory treatment and quarantine) and a re-orientation towards a rights-based
approach (informed and voluntary consent and testing under confidential or anonymous
conditions). The shift was championed by an alliance of gay leaders, civil libertarians,
physicians and public health officials (Bayer, 1991). Later, AIDS exceptionalism came to
describe the disease-specific global response and the resources dedicated to addressing
the epidemic (Smith & Whiteside, 2010).
Indeed, HIV and AIDS have received disproportionate funding relative to many
other epidemics. Ironically, though, this exceptional funding of HIV and AIDS
initiatives has also brought about a process of normalisation in many countries with
regard to the provision of HIV testing (e.g. Bayer & Fairchild, 2006; De Cock, 2005)
and AIDS treatment (disease integration, decentralisation) (e.g. Boyer et al., 2010;
Decroo et al., 2009), in which these services have become increasingly routine and are
integrated into the broader system of health-care services. While exceptionality affords
sustained ‘reliance on open-ended international solidarity’, normalisation implies an
extension of this funding relationship to the broader health system of the poorest
countries of the world (Ooms et al., 2010). Normalisation also includes the integration
of NGOs into the public-health sector as part of health systems strengthening efforts.
Global health proponents, recipient governments, foreign governments, donors and
other stakeholders widely recommend and support this horizontal approach. Most
notably, the Global Fund, GAVI Alliance, the World Bank and the World Health
Organisation have recently joined forces to create the Health Systems Funding
Platform. Does this signal the end of AIDS exceptionalism, both in terms of exceptional
funding and exceptional scale-up?
Importantly, the Mozambican case provides a third perspective on HIV and AIDS
exceptionalism. Even while the Mozambican government strove to reduce aid depend-
ency, HIV and AIDS funding became an exception. This political exceptionalism required
a negotiation over the framing of the epidemic and the objectives of HIV and AIDS
programming (Ooms, 2006, 2008). The Mozambican government has portrayed scale-up
simultaneously as an emergency response and an opportunity to resurrect the weak public
health-care system ruined during the country’s recent civil war.
What are the implications of this negotiation for health governance? As anthropolo-
gist Vinh-Kim Nguyen eloquently asks, how we can understand massive interventions
into the lives of populations defined by their medical conditions? Does it implicate
‘global’ or ‘foreign’ government-by-exception or government-by-rule? The significance
of such interventions is economic, socio-demographic and political (Nguyen, 2009). They
entail massive economic commitments into the undefined future. The end of AIDS
funding exceptionalism demands economic commitment to the entire burden of disease
on a global scale. The line of patients is growing rapidly in countries with meagre state
budgets that cannot afford the cost of health care. Will this burden create global health
exceptionalism? In other words, will the emergency rhetoric survive, when targeting
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multiple diseases? As Nguyen reflects, ‘As a humanitarian emergency, AIDS now defines
exception in political terms, as an issue that may in fragmented and partial ways suspend
national sovereignty’ (Nguyen, 2009, 201–202).
Methods
To address these questions, I draw on 15 months of multi-sited fieldwork conducted in
2005–2006 to explore the experiences, limitations and politics of ARV treatment in
Mozambique (Høg, 2008a). I interviewed hospital and health-centre country coordinators (5),
expatriate and Mozambican health workers in 5 NGO-driven Day Hospitals and 1 state
hospital (75), patients living with HIV and AIDS (30), Ministry of Health (MoH) staff and
ARV Committee members (10), and national and international NGO advocacy workers
(20). I also participated in numerous meetings, seminars and conferences, involving civil
society, government and international community representatives. Fieldwork involved full-
time participant observation, including office space hospitably offered by two advocacy
organisations. Additionally, I collected more than 1300 policy and data documents.
Epidemiological and antiretroviral treatment (ART) data were obtained from the MoH until
2010. Interviews, conducted in Portuguese with Mozambicans and English with foreigners,
were transcribed and analysed using the TAMS qualitative research software.
Exceptional event or structural problem
Initially, the Mozambican government had two choices for financing the response to HIV:
the health development paradigm (sustainability, domestic resources, self-determination
and sovereignty) or the medical relief paradigm (dependency, foreign aid, humanitarian
assistance and an exceptional response) (Ooms, 2006, 2008). Should HIV be classified as
a structural, emergency or exceptional problem? Should domestic budgets or interna-
tional funding solve the problem? There was no third way. Only exceptional problems
allow the use of the medical relief paradigm. The health development paradigm would aid
the Mozambican process, but the government had limited finances for action in favour of
its own agenda within its state budget. Money for antiretrovirals would take away scarce
resources from other expenditures. The government was not in a position to borrow the
money or to raise taxes to create financial space for AIDS medicines. Ooms shows how
the third way new health paradigm appeared (exceptional sustained international funding
for antiretrovirals). The Mozambican government pushed the ‘calamity button’ under the
given circumstances, which is common practice in a country with recurrent natural
disasters. Calamity funding relates to exceptional events with no limit to foreign assistance
(Ooms, 2008, 93). Disaster funding means that large sums of money enter the country,
but it also means more dependency on foreign aid. The calamity compromise specified
that when you cannot have access to basic health care for all and access to AIDS
treatment for some, paid by the state budget, then relief money is welcome, though this
means more dependency (Ooms, 2008, 93, 116, 130). This may sound contradictory to
the government policy attempting to reduce donor dependency. The AIDS treatment
programme became a political exception, adding a new dimension to AIDS
exceptionalism.
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Tracking scale-up in Mozambique
Exceptional scale-up
The lowering of generic drug prices in 2001 changed the scene in Mozambique. The cost
of ARV drugs per patient dropped from around 10,000 US dollars per year to around 350
dollars in early 2001, down to 132 dollars in July 2006 (MSF, 2006). In Mozambique, the
Clinton Foundation successfully negotiated lower drug prices from generic producers,
which provided the final motivation for Mozambique to introduce ART (Pfeiffer, 2013,
169) after much government reluctance in the Ministerial decree on AIDS treatment
(Ministry of Health, 2001). The ART ‘business plan’ was developed during 2002–2003
by the MoH, supported by the Clinton Foundation, Health Alliance International (HAI)
and others, with initial funding from the Global Fund (Republic of Mozambique and
Clinton Foundation, 2003). This was the original ART plan for nationwide scale-up with
MoH leadership. Meanwhile, Sant’Egidio and MSF Luxembourg had started small-scale
parallel NGO HIV and AIDS structures in 2001, followed by MSF Switzerland, ASIDH
Spain, HAI, ICAP and about 10 additional minor organisations.
Free large-scale ARV treatment through the public health system started in June 2004,
initially drawing on the WHO ‘public health’ approach in resource-poor settings (Gilks
et al., 2006), supported by the World Bank, the Clinton Foundation, PEPFAR, the Global
Fund, the governments of Ireland and Canada, and more (Høg, 2008a; Pfeiffer, 2013).
The 2003 ‘business plan’ designated this public health system approach to health services
delivery, but since parallel HIV and AIDS structures were already in operation, the
normalisation process was necessary. Additionally, significant funding from PEPFAR
created parallel structures that bypassed the government health system to directly fund
NGO partners (Pfeiffer, 2013, 169). The priorities of the Mozambican government and
the push by donors and global health stakeholders decided the relatively quick move
towards integrating HIV and AIDS services into the Mozambican public health system.
This move rested much on timing and circumstances. Its implementation is still in
progress in the fourth HIV decade.
Normalisation
The first steps to integrate HIV and AIDS care into the public health system began in
2005. The MoH intended to harmonise all aspects of the process, but different work
philosophies among the international treatment providers, different levels of technical and
human resources capacities, and general work overload all complicated its achievement.
In August 2006, Benedito, a member of the MoH ARV Committee, described ART
provided by NGOs as a ‘heavy machine’ out of proportions with reality in Mozambique:
The NGOs are working in a very heavy structure in terms of human resources. You will
notice that an NGO ART unit probably has 20–30 people working there. Administrator,
logistician, physician, laboratory technician, activist—a heavy machine that no African
country is under the condition to replicate. If we were to utilise the same strategy like the
NGOs, no African country would have the capacity to expand ART. We have to adapt to our
reality, our conditions. Our position from 2005 was the following: From now on as we get
involved with ART, we begin to target the whole process. We have started to create our own
models. We want to resolve the emergency problem. That is, with the conditions we have in
the [health] system – let’s start ART.
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The MoH introduced its own model: health counselling centres1 and AIDS care within
the public health system. This was a complicated, difficult, yet necessary challenge,
considering the priorities of the Mozambican government. Benedito said:
ART for us is a double challenge, because it is a disease that challenges the conditions that
we consider specialised at the primary level, and we are not prepared. And today we are
working in all of the system at the same time, trying to improve the quality of our existing
system.
In May 2008, the Mozambican government decided that all AIDS treatment services
should be integrated into the public health system. This meant closing down all parallel
NGO facilities with four objectives in mind: (a) Equity in access of services (for all
patients), (b) Efficiency, rationalisation and optimisation (health workers, infrastructure,
etc.), (c) Overall strengthening of the National Health Service and (d) Increased access
for AIDS patients (due to integration of services) (Health Partners Group, 2009).
Normalisation of HIV and AIDS services means the end of HIV exceptionalism in
terms of extraordinary care compared to other patient care. It means equal attention to all
diseases. Disease normalisation is part of the government’s post-independence struggle to
establish a National Health System – without parallel non-governmental structures that
are not under the legislative mandate of the MoH.
Epidemiology doubtfully motivated normalisation in health. The numbers are
daunting. The national 2007 adult HIV prevalence was estimated at 16%, with regional
variation: South (21%), Centre (18%) and North (9%) (Ministry of Health, 2008b). While
new UNAIDS assumptions have lowered prevalence rates to approximately 0.8 times the
prevalence found in antenatal clinic surveillance in countries like Mozambique without
population-based surveys to provide a more accurate estimate of the number of HIV
infected people, the estimated figures would, nevertheless, foresee a collapse of the health
system in the case of disease integration: UNAIDS suggests that 1.4 million Mozambicans
(range 1.2–1.6 million) were living with HIV by the end of 2010 (UNAIDS, 2011)
(Figure 1).
Likewise, the political and technical challenges of normalising AIDS treatment
remain enormous. The numbers escalated rapidly during 2004–2008: testing sites (359/
2006), treatment sites (213/2008), AIDS patients (128,000/2008), patients in need of
AIDS treatment (370,000/2007) (Ministry of Health, 2006, 2008a; UNAIDS, 2008). But
the exceptional focus on AIDS diverted scarce resources away from the primary health-
care system (Pfeiffer et al., 2010). Recent data reveal that the number of AIDS patients
Figure 1. HIV prevalence, 2001–2011. Sources: Ministry of Health (2005c, 2008b) and UNAIDS
(2008, 2011).
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more than doubled from 128,000 in 2008 to 270,000 in 2012 (GFATM, 2013), while the
ones in need of treatment lamentably also doubled to 600,000 (UNAIDS, 2012).
Moreover, the health system already faced a high disease burden. Malaria has been
declared a national emergency. Nearly 6 million of the country’s 20 million people
suffered from this disease in 2005 (GFATM, 2006). Tuberculosis affects more than
30,000 people every year, which makes Mozambique one of the worst affected countries
in the world (GFATM, 2007). Moreover, the burden of disease also includes diarrhoea,
measles, cholera, tetanus, pneumonia, rabies, whooping cough, polio, meningitis, plague
and sleeping sickness. It comes as no surprise that the efficiency objective overwhelms
the limited carrying capacity of the health system (Decroo et al., 2009).
However, the new funding paid for drugs, and not for the recruitment and training of
health workers. The human resource question posed an identical dilemma, since neither
emergency nor state funding could solve it (not an exception and insufficient state
budgetary room). Ooms coined this the Medicines Without Doctors Paradox (Ooms,
2008; Ooms, van Damme, & Temmerman, 2007). Health workers were forgotten under
the principle of AIDS exceptionalism, which exclusively paid for the medicines. A recent
study conducted in Central Mozambique showed how human resource shortages
negatively affected the risk of patient dropout (Lambdin et al., 2011). There are not
enough health workers and infrastructure to deal with the influx of new patients to the
integrated services, though task shifting to non-physician providers has proven successful
(Sherr et al., 2009).
Public health and the discourse of sovereignty and nationhood
Intimate and distant partners
Benedito said with sincerity: ‘All these people that are coming to work for the country need
to understand that they come to work within a system.’ ‘Common funds’, ‘sector wide
approaches to health’2 and central drug procurement and distribution were established as
harmonisation procedures towards this end. This happens in accordance with the UN ‘Three
Ones’ principles, defined as One National AIDS Coordinating Body, One Monitoring and
Evaluation Framework and One Agreed AIDS Action Framework. Indeed, international
funding and global health governance stakeholders have also pushed for national ownership –
with reference to the ‘Three Ones’, The Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda and decen-
tralisation (World Bank, UNAIDS, PEPFAR, USAID and WHO). But I maintain that the
Mozambican government strategically appropriates these calls into its discourse of political
power. The political process is pre-eminently about respect for the Mozambican nation-
building project and the longstanding goal of one unique public health system.
In general, the Mozambican government welcomes those international organisations that
approve the goal of public health systems strengthening, but it embraces the ones that agree
to end AIDS exceptionalism to improve overall health-care delivery. The government does
not salute affirmative action for AIDS under the circumstances of high disease burden.
I distinguish between intimate and distant government partners. Intimate partners are
those that agree to the national health project and have worked for many years in
Mozambique as government cooperantes. Prime examples include HAI, MSF Luxem-
bourg and Sant’Egidio that worked in Mozambique many years before the response to
HIV. Distant partners are those that do not enjoy the trust of the government, as they
construct parallel health structures. The government perceives them as unruly trouble-
makers, when and if they do not abide by the rules of integration and one public health
system without parallel competition. I have elsewhere introduced the introduction of
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PEPFAR as an example (Høg, 2008b). The Mozambican government initially perceived
the Bush administration as arrogant and neo-colonial as it ignored negotiation. However,
upon insistence, they produced an agreement that honoured Mozambican priorities
(Sontag, 2004). But the process turned out to be muddy during the early days of
‘partnerships’ and ‘multi-sectoral’ approaches. According to Pfeiffer, PEPFAR was the
outlier among donors, avoiding ‘basket funding’, while insisting on NGO targets for
support. Yet, PEPFAR could not completely avoid the public system, since the MoH
provided most services. PEPFAR was awkwardly attached to the public health system
(Pfeiffer, 2013, 169).
Health care in Mozambique: a native reserve
In other words, health care in Mozambique remains an ideological fortress. I invoke two
events that took place during 2006 to develop this argument: the first national meeting on
STI/HIV/AIDS and the third signing of the Kaya Kwanga Commitment between the
MoH and NGOs. Health care represents the very identity and success of the reigning
party. I have already said that foreign-sponsored ART challenges this ideological position:
it is therefore a test of capability and autonomy in the government’s relation with bilateral
and multilateral donor partners. I draw four lessons from this analysis, which may seem
idiosyncratic and even contradictory: (1) the problem is coordination, not partnerships,
(2) the problem is diminished sovereignty, caused by partnerships, (3) the government
insists on national leadership of the development process and (4) the Mozambican
government will depend on foreign aid for many years, aggravated by the increasing need
for sustained financial and human resources to scale up HIV, AIDS and all other health
services.
The ambivalence of partnerships
The first (five-day) national meeting on STDs and HIV/AIDS was held at the MoH in
March 2006. Participants included representatives from Sant’Egidio, HAI, MSF, Clinton
Foundation, CDC, DFID, Columbia University, National Institute of Health, MONASO,
Médicos Mundi, provincial health managers, MoH staff, the National STI/HIV/AIDS
Program and the National AIDS Council.
NAP Director Alfredo Mac-Arthur opened the meeting. He addressed the issue of
partnerships in a sympathetic yet vexed manner by saying ‘We can’t close the doors.’
However, from his facial expression I wondered whether he was celebrating or lamenting
this fact, as I imagined him continue: ‘even if we wanted to’. After all, I had heard the
politicisation of HIV by the Minister of Health, the President and the Prime Minister: they
insist on national sovereignty. At least rhetorically, less in practice, as pragmatism and
contradictions characterise the Mozambican government. I had also noticed the issue of
foreign human resources as one of the most politically sensitive issues of the HIV
epidemic. The HIV epidemic not only brought another infectious disease problem to the
general population: it initiated a new unprecedented era of foreign aid dependence that
the government would prefer to do without, in the continued struggle for political and
economic independence.
Mac-Arthur addressed the challenges on how to progressively integrate HIV and
AIDS into the National Health System by emphasising that ‘The problem is not financing
and it is not partnerships. The challenge is coordination’. This reminded me of an
interview at UNDP, where I was told ‘We see a sector wide SWAP coordination
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recommended, but each sector still works on its own. They are not ready for this level of
coordination’. It also echoed decades-long policy debates about the large number of
external agencies involved in health sectors of developing countries (Buse & Walt, 1997)
and the particular issue of unwanted parallel non-governmental structures and vertical
funding in Mozambique (Mussa, Pfeiffer, Gloyd, & Sherr, 2013; Pfeiffer, 2003, 2013;
Pfeiffer et al., 2008; Sherr et al., 2013). Therefore, the major objective of the National
STI/HIV/AIDS Program was to review and adjust the Mozambican response and targets
in relation to accumulated experience and the reality within the country. The final meeting
produced 14 decisions. Four important decisions that relate to the purpose of this article
are (1) nationwide ART expansion, (2) integrate HIV/AIDS services into the public health
system, (3) increase training of MoH health workers and (4) no HIV testing facility
outside MoH facilities (USAID, 2006).
Mozambican leadership
The MoH leads the process to regulate its relations with its partners. This is called the
Kaya Kwanga Commitment. This process began in 1999, after nearly a decade of freedom
of association that produced a heavy presence of NGOs. The first code of conduct related
the following: (1) commitment to the health reform process, (2) no legal implications, (3)
existing bilateral and multilateral agreements remain intact and (4) development of ‘a
sector wide approach to health’ (Ministry of Health, 2000). The second code of conduct
was signed in July 2003 (Ministry of Health, 2003), and the third in August 2006
(Ministry of Health, 2005a).
The three agreements compare in terms of purposes, commitments, principles and
mechanisms for the relation between the MoH and its external partners in the pursuit of
Mozambican policy goals (Ministry of Health, 2000). The key objectives are public
health (health of the population), capacity (sustainable health care) and idealism (gradual
access to health care for all citizens). In other words, idealistic objectives should be taken
with a grain of salt: action is essentially pragmatic. Nonetheless, the three codes of
conduct strongly emphasise Mozambican leadership: sovereignty, empowerment, trust
and capacity. To this end, the MoH sets the agenda for all strategies, plans and guidelines
in line with the ideal type of governance defined by Foucault as an interdependent
triangular modus of sovereignty-discipline-government (Foucault, 1979).
National self-determination
This assertion can be supported by discourse analysis of the meeting in which the 2006
Kaya Kwanga Commitment was signed. The meeting gathered about 120 participants,
who represented the MoH and international and national NGOs. The Minister talked for
50 minutes about health and cooperation in Mozambique: (1) coordination between the
MoH and NGOs, (2) respect for the dignity of Mozambique and Mozambicans and (3)
authorisation to work in Mozambique.
Garrido initially emphasised: ‘We need to work in an organized manner. Someone has
to lead the process’. Garrido referred to the ‘problem of coordination between hundreds
of NGOs’, their ‘inefficiency’ and the ‘confusion’ that it produced. A reoccurring
problem was the ‘foreign personnel that work within the National Health System without
permission from the Ministry of Health’. Garrido repeated the rules of the process and
emphasised that foreigners need ‘government authorisation’ to work in Mozambique.
Garrido thundered: ‘It’s a matter of sovereignty. It’s about respect for human beings’.
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This was a loud and serious monologue. The audience listened in complete silence,
somewhat perplexed.
Leadership, discipline and sovereignty
The Minister implied that foreign health workers do not respect the Mozambican
government and Mozambicans, and that they do not have sufficient qualifications to work
in Mozambique. Garrido followed the nationalistic supposedly uncompromising way of
doing politics, which dictates retention of sovereign power to show who is in control
governing the Mozambican nation. This is not far from the first president Samora
Machel’s way with words during the 1970s (Machel, 1985, 163).
Colonial legacies
Contemporary discourse eloquently epitomises the past, even as the government portrays
the old Mozambican system as ‘centralized and obsolete, which belongs to a state
apparatus model conceived at a different point in history’ (Ministry of Health, 2005b). In
my experience, a discourse has emerged within the political and health system transition
characterised by opposing signifiers, pointing to the future, looking to the past. Indeed, a
culture of contradictions remains an intrinsic feature of Mozambican politics (Mackintosh
& Wuyts, 1988; Saul, 1985; Sidaway, 1992), but what is power in such a situation? Today,
an ideological hodgepodge surrounds the government. Think of HAI, World Bank,
PEPFAR, GFATM, Sant’Egidio, ASIDH, MSF, UNAIDS, Humana People to People,
DANIDA, CARE, HOPE, and many more: one government against ‘1001 actors’ from all
corners of the political spectrum. The varying roles of donors, governments and non-state
providers, what Palmer calls ‘an awkward threesome’ (Palmer, 2006), influence the
emerging mix of ART delivery models in African countries (Harries, Makombe,
Schouten, Ben-Smith, & Jahn, 2008).
Though much has changed and is still changing in Mozambique, through political and
health systems transition, its colonial legacy nevertheless plays an important role for its
national responses to infectious disease epidemics, including HIV. Mozambique retains
key elements of the Portuguese ‘vertical’ administration along a fusion of socialist,
modernist and nationalist ideologies (Pitcher, 2002). In this sense, Mozambique remains
an African ideological chameleon with historical and contemporary political ties to its
colonial power, socialism and communism, neoliberalism (promotion of free markets,
privatisation, small government, and economic deregulation (Pfeiffer & Chapman, 2010,
150)), welfare states and the Portuguese-speaking community.
In my experience, the double discourse prevails: the government remains against
privatisation and parallel structures. However, it cannot save its health-care system
without external donor support and it cannot pay its health workers salaries that compare
to international standards. Health workers lose their motivation to stay within the public
health system: they seek greener grass with the NGOs. According to Garrido, ‘The UN
and the NGOs are sucking my blood!’ (Lewis, 2006).
The Minister of Health finally gave some credit to the international and national non-
governmental organisations: ‘In general we have good and professional relations with
NGOs. We highly value the collaboration with NGOs. Let us continue to improve this
relation, with respect for the dignity of Mozambicans in mind’.
This was to me a surprising change of tone considering the long talk about
sovereignty and disrespect. It would have made more sense to begin the meeting giving
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praise to partnerships considering its nature. The ministry had already set the welcoming
tone during the preparatory meeting in November 2005:
We need general norms to improve the relation between NGOs and MoH. Contracting opens
the possibility for MoH funding. But NGOs are not obliged to contract MoH. At the same
time, contracts will not change the way each NGO works. We do not want to speak about
conditionality. It is not what it is about. Complementarity is the general principle. I want to
emphasise that we do not intend to create difficulties for the work of NGOs. People are dying
and they need your intervention.
Anthropologist James Pfeiffer followed the early Kaya Kwanga process during the 1990s.
I agree with Pfeiffer’s uncertainty as to why the code of conduct was necessary: it could
imply a certain level of misconduct and it could be an empty strategic gesture considering
its non-legal nature (Pfeiffer, 2004). However, it could signal an ideological compromise
between the government, the donors and implementers.
Who calls the shots?
The Mozambican government continues to demand full sovereignty as set out at
independence. It therefore maintains an ambivalent position towards foreign aid, ART
funding and foreign health workers. Politicians call for national self-determination, in my
interpretation, with or without the HIV epidemic. Such a call for sovereignty would be
irrelevant in an apolitical world for the response to the HIV epidemic. Economic and
human resources would ideally come from anywhere in the world. However, the real
world is different: it remains questionable whether international organisations could
recruit the number of health workers needed in Southern Africa. Yet, the Mozambican
government experiences the impact of external threats to Mozambican sovereignty: NGO
competition, privatisation and the internal brain drain. Nevertheless, I have shown the
contradictory twist to this phenomenon: it is part of the political rhetoric to keep the
sovereignty discourse alive and dominant, while in practical terms the real challenge is
coordination, not partnerships. In other words, the government produces the sovereignty
and nation-building discourses through political strategy with public health implications.
These are some of the key factors that must be kept in mind, when we try to understand
statements such as ‘it’s about sovereignty’ and ‘respect the dignity of Mozambicans’.
But the most striking feature of the government discourse targeted at Mozambican
citizens is the absence of reference to global health initiatives related to health systems
strengthening and decentralisation of AIDS care. Yet, the schism presented by Ooms
between the health development paradigm and the medical relief paradigm shows
intrinsic struggles over ownership of the development process. HIV increases aid
dependency, which adds to the progressive demise of the government development
agenda. However, the problem cannot be solved without external funding. This creates a
‘culture of political contradictions’, which helps us to understand the politics of HIV
scale-up in terms of nation-building and self-determination.
The policy shifts presented in this article towards exceptional sustained international
funding for HIV and the normalisation of access to health care in the public health system
pose challenging questions for the politics of global health in the fourth decade. What are
the political implications of global health governance considering the (diminishing) role
of the nation-state? What are the implications of an alleged growing local rhetoric and
insistence on local government ownership of decentralisation in health, when arguably
the real decision makers belong to foreign governments and donors that at the end of the
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day also pay all the bills? ‘Who calls the shots’, as Hanlon asked more than two decades
ago (Hanlon, 1991), implying that the ultimate decision-making power locates outside
Mozambique. Do the new funding trends implicate ‘global’ or ‘foreign’ government-by-
exception or government-by-rule, thinking with Nguyen (Nguyen, 2009)? Will it create
global health exceptionalism? What is the fate of the exceptional funding introduced here
as the third way between state budgets and donor aid? Ooms and colleagues advocate a
Global Health Fund, but fear the lack of donor commitments (Ooms, Van Damme, Baker,
Zeitz, & Schrecker, 2008). The nature, future and politics of global health funding and
implementation still need to be explored, evidenced in the current literature (e.g. Ingram,
2013; Sundewall et al., 2011). As we have seen, the Mozambican government wants
sovereign nation-building and less dependency on foreign donor aid, yet it pragmatically
welcomes external sponsorship. Global health governance tends to be depoliticised, but in
the long run nation states and the global health community will be faced by questions of
sovereignty, power, domination and the politics of interference with the health of
populations of other states.
Notes
1. I visited a pilot CTH clinic in 2006: The consultation is a normal clinic with no specific disease-
related indications why the patient seeks health care (e.g. AIDS ribbon, posters). The doctor
performs several health tests, including HIV, yet with patient consent. This pilot test showed a
rapid increase in the number of people testing for HIV.
2. Unfortunately, I did not gain access to participate in Health SWAP meetings, due to the dynamic
political situation within the MoH. The SWAP HIV Working Group did not feel it prudent to
allow an outside observer to attend their meetings.
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